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4 Ireland and the United Kingdom 
 
Maxine David 
 
As two islands situated separately from the European mainland and at an appreciable 
distance from Russia, the United Kingdom and Ireland are relatively independent of 
Russia and its politics. That said, both are as susceptible to the pressures of the 
globalising world and thus, for both, Russia is a state that warrants attention, albeit in 
the case of each, for quite different reasons. Close geographically and historically, 
Ireland and the UK are nevertheless vastly different foreign policy actors, not least by 
virtue of the one having been colonized by the other. They are distinguished today by 
disparities in size, resources and global influence and inevitably these factors too result 
in each having quite different relations with Russia. Those differences extend to each 
state’s relationship with the EU as well: Ireland’s reputation within the EU is a positive 
one, that of a committed and well-adapted member state; the UK, meanwhile, is most 
often characterized as an ‘awkward’ partner, whose attitude to EU membership is 
ambivalent at best. 
 
This chapter seeks first to identify the basis for and nature of Irish and British relations 
with Russia. In the case of Ireland, the relationship is primarily an economic rather than 
political one. For the UK, both economics and politics figure highly and interactions 
between the UK and Russia are more intensive and extensive than in the Irish case. It is 
of little surprise, therefore, that the UK has experienced far more problems in its 
relations with Russia than has Ireland. With the nature of the relationships established, I 
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move on to consider Irish and British relations with the EU. In examining the impact of 
these bilateral relationships with Russia on the EU, I argue that neither case presents 
many problems for the EU, albeit for quite different reasons. The chapter concludes 
with a short discussion on the contribution of each member state to EU-level attempts to 
adopt a unified Russia policy. 
 
IRELAND 
 
The story of Irish foreign policy is that of a small state (Laffan 2007, O’Regan 2010) on 
Europe’s periphery. A former British colony, its ‘tradition is largely one of dependence 
and adaptation to external terms of reference’ (Hay and Smith 2010: 126). Ireland’s 
sense of identity is rooted in a principled adherence to its neutrality, to the pursuit of 
values as well as interests, and to the upholding of human rights. The official discourse 
is one of an historical engagement with the rest of the world, beginning with 
missionaries in the sixth and seventh centuries and continuing today through trading 
relations and a commitment to multilateralism, as evidenced through membership of the 
UN, EU, OSCE and so on. Its engagement in multilateral fora is necessitated by its 
relative lack of economic resources, affecting its ability to conduct an independent 
foreign policy. In 2011, for instance, its mandatory contributions to international 
organizations, primarily the UN, consumed almost two thirds of the annual budget of 
the Department for Foreign Affairs. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the UN and EU are 
considered to be of particular significance; the EU itself described as ‘a central 
framework’ through which Ireland seeks to achieve its foreign policy goals (Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade [Ireland] 2012). For much of the post-Cold War period, 
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Ireland has been focused on its domestic economic problems. Motivated by the desire to 
improve its economic standing and the objective of ‘rebuilding Ireland’s international 
reputation’ (Gilmore 2011), the Irish Government has sought deeper, more extensive 
engagement with other states, particularly with the emerging economies, including 
Russia. As a result, although Ireland has had some historical encounters with Russia, the 
bilateral relationship today has to be seen in the context of Ireland’s economic 
difficulties and the need to find new, promising markets. 
 
What historical links there are between the two states derive mostly from their mutual 
revolutionary experiences, although economic ties can be traced further back to tsarist 
Russia. In the 1920s, the Communist International (Comintern) was instrumental in 
assisting the Communist Party of Ireland and was resolutely pro IRA. The Comintern 
saw Ireland, ‘as a flashpoint adjacent to the heart of British imperialism and the 
homeland of a diaspora spread throughout the empire and the USA’ (O’Connor 2003: 
117). The Comintern was active, of course, wherever it felt there might be fertile ground 
for Bolshevik ideas, including in respect of the UK’s Trade Union movement in the 
1920s. The Russo--Irish relationship would be sustained later by reason of Ireland’s 
geostrategic significance and perception of mutually beneficial economic opportunities. 
Cultural links should be neither ignored nor over-stated. Particularly notable are the 
Irish pianist and composer John Field’s near-30 year stay in Russia and early nineteenth 
influence over the Russian piano school; as well as the Irish poet, lyricist and singer 
Thomas Moore’s influence on Russian poets and writers (in 2011 a statue of Moore was 
unveiled in St Petersburg). Russia remains keen on Irish culture today. Irish dancing is 
particularly popular and both Moscow and St Petersburg hold annual dance 
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competitions (feis), in which both Russian and non-Russian dancers compete. St 
Patrick’s Day has been celebrated in Russia since 1992, Moscow, St Petersburg, Kazan 
and other Russian cities hold festivities and Irish music and dance again plays a central 
role. Dublin also holds an increasingly well-established annual Festival of Russian 
Culture, which attracts visitors and participants from both countries. 
 
Most emphasis must be placed on the economic relationship, however. As Cold War 
relations thawed in the 1970s and 80s, Ireland provided a vital stopping point for 
Russian airplanes en route to the USA, Aeroflot establishing a fuel base at Shannon 
airport in 1980. Most famously, in 1994, President Yeltsin failed to disembark a plane at 
Shannon, sparking a minor diplomatic embarrassment for the Taoiseach, Albert 
Reynolds. But it was those links established in the late Soviet period that positioned 
Ireland well for the immediate post-Soviet period, translating into Irish management of 
Russian airports and the establishment of the first Irish bar at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo 
airport: Aer Rianta International Duty Free (ARI) began operating at Sheremetyevo as 
early as 1989. It now runs duty free operations at four airports in Moscow and St 
Petersburg, notably winning a seven year contract in 2007 to develop further duty-free 
services at Sheremetyevo’s new Terminal Three. The traffic is two-way, in April 2012, 
for example, it was announced that the Russian airline, Transaero, had bought an airline 
maintenance business at Shannon airport. Cooperation literally extends through the 
stratosphere: in June 2012, Ireland signed an agreement with Russia on bilateral 
cooperation on space exploration. 
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Ireland experienced a high growth in exports to Russia in 2010 and 2011, a response to 
Ireland’s domestic problems as well as the global banking crisis which made credit-
raising activities very problematic. Russia has so far proved to be a fertile market for 
Ireland’s ambitions. In 2009, the Ireland--Russia Business Association (IRBA) was 
established. Its head, Constantin Gurdgiev, accounts for IRBA as the result of 
calculation of future opportunities for both states following Ireland’s 2007-8 investment 
in Russian industries such as construction, logistics and industrial development. In 2010 
and 2011, Ireland featured in the bottom five of the member states in respect of both 
import and export revenue, making it a relatively unimportant player in the EU--Russia 
relationship. However, the Irish export market to Russia grew by an impressive 46 per 
cent from 342 million euros in 2010 to 500 million in 2011 (Eurostat 2012). This 
growth was experienced by many other member states although Ireland was one of only 
a handful to maintain a trading surplus with Russia in both years. The upwards trend 
looks set to continue for Ireland, with reports of a 32 per cent increase in Irish exports to 
Russia in the first quarter of 2012 (Corcoran 2012a). 
 
In 2012, Ireland made concerted efforts to ensure this growth continued. In February, a 
delegation went to Moscow to meet Russian counterparts in tourism, sales, conference 
and events organization in a bid to promote Ireland as a destination of choice. This was 
followed by an Enterprise Ireland trade mission, which in June 2012 spent five days of 
intensive networking in Russia. A third mission is planned for the autumn of 2012. The 
export market comprises many sectors: food, medical and pharmaceutical, agri-
equipment and service industries. Irish companies such as PM Group, anticipating the 
decline of the construction industry in Ireland, focused on Russia, while Ireland is also 
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moderately successful there in the soft drinks and alcoholic drinks industry. Although 
Ireland is also targeting Brazil and China, the Russian market presents more 
opportunities. It is noted, for instance, that Russia represents a better consumer market 
given its high rate of GDP per capita - more than double that of China in 2010 
(Gurdgiev in Corcoran 2012b). 
 
Part of Russia’s interest in Ireland lies in the reputation it built as the ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
from the mid 1990s until the economic downturn in 2008. Ireland also provides a base 
from which re-exporters can conduct trading relations with other European countries 
and the USA (Gurdgiev in Nikitenko 2011), indeed, their links with the USA are also 
seen as good opportunities. Investment opportunities for Russians lie in the 
pharmaceuticals industry and information and communications technology (ICT), 
industries that are well represented by the big trans-national names. Other areas are 
airline leasing, financial services, and legal services. Work has already been done to 
ensure both states are more physically connected to each other, with the reinstatement of 
direct flights, for example, the Moscow to Dublin route on S7 in 2008. These physical 
links, coupled with the cultural links outlined above, mean that there is an increasing 
passage of people between each state. However, Tourism Ireland points out that 
Russians have ‘limited understanding of what the island of Ireland has to offer as a 
holiday destination’, their aim is therefore ‘to begin building awareness in Russia of the 
many things to see and do’ (Tourism Ireland 2012). This ‘limited understanding’, 
incidentally, is in marked contrast to the UK, which has no trouble attracting visitors or 
business, a fact of which Ireland seeks to take advantage. In 2011, the Irish Government 
instituted a visa waiver scheme, making it easier for tourists from Russia (and other 
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countries), to travel between the UK and Ireland. Tourism Ireland notes that over 24 
million people are now travelling out of Russia and that in 2010 the UK received an 
increase of over 23 per cent of Russian visitors. The visa waiver scheme is designed to 
encourage those tourists to make the extra trip over to Ireland. 
 
Ireland in the EU 
 
Ireland is widely seen as a ‘good’ partner within the EU, both within the Brussels 
context and in respect of domestic attitudes and behaviour. Eurobarometer data 
consistently record the Irish people as strongly in favour of the EU (see Kennedy and 
Sinnott 2007 for evidence that the picture is more divided and complex than this), 
notwithstanding the Irish people’s rejections of the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2008. Like other member states, Ireland experiences differing political party 
stances towards EU membership but nevertheless, the dominant political party discourse 
has long been a positive one. Historically, two of the larger parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael, have been supportive of Irish membership of the EC/U. The Labour Party had 
traditionally exhibited greater concerns about membership but over time its position has 
softened somewhat and the attitude towards the EU today might be described more as 
one of a ‘critical friend’. (See Devine 2009 for an historiographical account of Irish 
political parties’ attitudes on neutrality and how these play out in EU interactions.) 
 
In Brussels itself, Ireland operates with a small number of officials who have relatively 
high levels of autonomy in relation to their capacity to negotiate on behalf of their 
government. Ireland is described as a member state which accords the EU a high 
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priority in its workload; as ‘solution-oriented rather than problem-focused’; and which 
delivers high quality, flexible positions in a timely fashion (Panke 2010: 771, 780-2). 
Panke’s results, it should be noted, differ from Laffan’s (2010: 704-5) inasmuch as the 
latter speaks of Ireland as being low-skilled and with information of an average quality. 
On the other hand, Laffan also finds that Ireland bargains effectively by virtue of its 
practice of limiting its interactions to just that handful of issues which it chooses to 
prioritize, explaining Ireland’s relative lack of involvement in the EU’s Russia policy. 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Examination of the UK--Russia relationship shows that over 450 years and more of 
history between these two countries, there remains a surprisingly high degree of 
continuity in their relations, notwithstanding certain periods when they stood on 
opposite sides in a conflict. The relationship dates back to1553 and the ‘discovery’ of 
Russia by an Englishman, Richard Chancellor, who established relations between the 
English monarchy and the Russian tsars; establishing also the first trading relationship 
(through the Muscovy Company) between a western European state and Russia. 
England continued to occupy a privileged trading position and an active diplomatic 
relationship. Culture also figured highly from the beginning, the Russian connections in 
Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost, for instance, reflecting the high degree of public 
attention paid to Russia in Elizabethan England. Thus, from its very beginnings, the 
UK--Russia relationship was characterized by trade, diplomacy, monarchical links and 
culture. Only the loss of the Russian monarchy has changed this configuration, although 
other dynamics have been added to it. 
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Keen to continue trading, to share and explore cultural links and to interact at the 
highest diplomatic levels, the two states are nevertheless today often divided by their 
differing ideas about what constitutes ‘appropriate’ behaviour. Indeed, the very question 
of what constitutes legitimate behaviour and who adheres ‘best’ to such standards, 
divides the two. They meet in a range of fora, but given the comparative international 
status of the UN, G8 and EU, it is unsurprising that the UK sees the EU as one forum 
through which to manage relations with Russia, but not the most important one. Many 
UK foreign policy actions are defined by the close UK—USA relationship, inevitably 
affecting Russian perceptions of the UK (see David 2011). From the UK and USA 
perspectives, they are ranged on opposite sides to Russia in relation to democracy, 
respect for law and human rights, and so in respect of what constitutes dominant 
international organizational thought on legitimacy. Russia, as seen clearly in the New 
Cold War discourse (see Sakwa 2008, Galbreath 2008), is still perceived by both as 
relatively unprogressive, adhering to sovereign, Westphalian norms of international 
organization. The 1999 Kosovo crisis, the 2003 Iraq War, Libya in 2010, the ongoing 
(in 2012) Syrian situation – on all of these the UK and USA have met with Russian 
opposition in the UN. The UK--USA position is officially that such large-scale 
humanitarian crises cannot be ignored by the ‘international community’, that justice 
must be served; the Russians argue for the upholding of international law, respect for 
the primacy of the UN and state sovereignty, and proper consideration for the impact of 
intervention on international order. These positions go some way to explaining why 
much of the UK—Russia relationship is mediated through a US rather than EU lens. 
Add to this the UK’s ambitions as a foreign policy actor and the realization forced upon 
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it by, for instance, the 1956 Suez Crisis that it cannot be an effective actor without the 
support of the USA. There are, in fact, underlying foreign policy similarities between 
France and the UK: neither is fully reconciled to its reduced position in the world; both 
realize that a fully independent foreign policy does not always make for an effective 
one; and both seek to align themselves with other actors that will facilitate the 
achievement of objectives. For the UK, the EU’s relative weakness means it is not the 
sensible option (and increasingly as Le Noan shows, France shares the same concerns). 
 
Despite this, there are appreciable differences between the UK’s foreign policy 
approaches and those of others, such that a distinct British style is discernible, including 
in respect of Russia. The UK has steered a path between the more (arguably, overly) 
conciliatory Franco--German approach to Russia and the antagonism of the US, 
avoiding what Russia certainly sees as the excesses of legislation such as the Jackson—
Vanik amendment and the proposed Magnitsky bill, but avoiding too the type of 
criticism levelled at Sarkozy over Georgia or Schröder generally (see Le Noan and 
Stewart in this volume). While in a global economy, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
separate the political from the economic, it is precisely this separation that the UK has 
sought to maintain in its relations with Russia, with some success as discussed below. 
 
Differing perceptions, even values, explain the often discordant nature of the political 
relationship but it is also the case that the relationship is conducted at more than just the 
intergovernmental level and should not be reduced to that. Indeed, in the British case, 
business interests might be said to function as the glue that holds the relationship 
together, even when intergovernmental relations have come close to breaking. Business 
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interests dominate and at the societal level too, there is a genuine, shared desire for 
interaction. The relationship can only be understood, therefore, through an analysis of 
not only the intergovernmental relationship but also those of the business community 
and people-to-people contacts. To an extent, this is a false division for the two societal-
based groups are not completely free of government involvement. This is Russia’s 
point: that it is disingenuous to argue that the British government is removed from the 
activities of those working with and amongst ordinary Russians. Thus, Russia interprets 
external funding of NGOs working on its territory as an attempt to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Russia, symbolized by the signing in July 2012 of Russia’s NGO 
Law, popularly dubbed in western media as the ‘NGO foreign agents law’. In 
considering the work in Russia of actors such as the British Council and the BBC World 
Service, one cannot disregard the links that can be drawn between them and the British 
government but it is nevertheless fair to ascribe to them a good deal of agency as 
entities working independent of British governmental interference and oversight in 
terms of their day-to-day running. 
 
UK--Russia intergovernmental relations 
 
The intergovernmental relationship is characterized by high level diplomatic activity, 
directed at the pursuit of national interests and the shaping of interactions within the 
international system. A high point for the UK was Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
role as interlocutor between the US President, Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader, 
Mikhail Gorbachev. However, British influence since has not been seen to serve 
Russian interests. A discourse of insistence that Russia must move further down the 
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road of democratization, successive international interventions and differing ideas about 
what constitutes legal and legitimate intervention mean that Russia has learned to 
distrust the USA and UK equally. Divided as the UK and Russia are on such subjects, 
there is a clear imperative to cooperate: the FCO refers to climate change, trade, 
Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iran (HoC Defence Committee 2009). More direct 
threats also necessitate cooperation, cyber security, for instance, is creeping up the 
UK—Russia political agenda. In late 2011, GCHQ reported it was ‘disturbed’ by the 
high number of cyber attacks against the UK, with Russia and China identified as the 
worst ‘culprits’. 
 
The vested nature of the UK’s interest in Russia is clear. A stable, democratic Russia 
issues fewer challenges than an unstable, economically weak and authoritarian version. 
This was the immediate preoccupation for the UK as the USSR fell apart. Uncertainties 
lay in whether mass, economically-induced migration from Russia might ensue and of 
particular concern was what would happen to the Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical, 
possibly biological, as well as conventional weaponry (interview with former British 
ambassador 2012)
 1
. Today, however, Russia is not deemed to represent a direct 
existential threat to the UK, although the question of whether the more assertive nature 
of Russian foreign policy represents a threat to Europe is not dismissed (HoC Defence 
Committee 2009). In 1991 the UK was alive both to the threats and opportunities: 
Russia then (and today), offered a vast, unsaturated market. 
 
As early as 1992, Alexander Shokin (Russian Minister of Labour and Employment) and 
Michael Heseltine (UK Secretary of State for Trade and President of Board of Trade) 
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signed an Agreement on Economic Cooperation. The agreement confirmed the 
establishment of the still extant UK—Russia Intergovernmental Steering Committee on 
Trade and Investment and spoke of encouraging financing mechanisms, training and 
exchange of knowledge and skills. Thus, as with the earliest beginnings of the 
relationship, economic and trading relations were high on the bilateral agenda. Early 
trade took the form of cosmetics, confectionery, alcohol and motor cars particularly and 
sales, it was anticipated, would only increase as Russians became more prosperous. 
Security concerns as well as trading interests ensured strong diplomatic relations were 
maintained from the beginning, with President Yeltsin visiting four times in eight years, 
British Prime Ministers the same (FCO 2000). That top level activity was mirrored by 
numerous ministerial visits and an increase in the traffic of ordinary people out to 
Russia (see David 2011). 
 
Despite relations at the highest level of government remaining on a firm, even if 
sometimes shaky, footing until midway through the first decade of the new century, 
there were early signs that Russia had not fully reconciled itself to western ideas about 
Russia’s (reduced) position and what the post-Cold War world should look like. Nuclear 
non-proliferation, disputes over the CFE Treaty, the continued existence of NATO, let 
alone its enlargement: all these and more would serve to upset Russia’s relations with 
the USA, and, by association, the UK. Nevertheless, despite deep divisions between 
Russia and the UK over the 1999 Kosovo crisis and British concerns over Chechnya, in 
2000 the UK would be the first overseas destination for the new (acting) Russian 
President, Putin. The early relationship between then-Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
Putin was a good one and seemed to bode well for the bilateral relationship, 
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notwithstanding the second Chechen War and Blair’s oft-referenced promulgation of 
and commitment to an ‘ethical’ foreign policy. For some, Blair trod the wrong side of 
his own commitments; both he and his Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, for instance, 
condemned Russian actions in Chechnya but this was insufficient for the Foreign 
Affairs Select Committee which roundly questioned the Government’s reaction in 
December 1999, deeming it insufficient in scope. Cook and Blair continued, outwardly 
at least, to speak positively of Russia, even as the Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
heard more and more evidence of a deteriorating relationship and of an increasing 
divide between the USA and Russia, which, given close Anglo—American relations, 
would inevitably impact negatively on the Anglo—Russian relationship (HoC, 1999). 
Blair’s failed attempt to reconcile the US and Russian positions over the USA’s 
proposed Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the Iraq War of 2003, and the burgeoning 
relationship between Russia and France and Germany, all contributed to the cooling of 
the intergovernmental relationship. The crisis when it came was in the form of an event 
no government could ignore. 
 
The circumstances of the 2006 murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB/FSB 
agent, are the stuff of fiction. Litvinenko was granted political asylum in London after 
speaking out in Russia against the security forces, claiming he had been ordered by 
them to murder Russian oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, who had himself by now fled 
Russia to Britain. Once in London, and soon to become a British citizen, Litvinenko 
made further allegations against the Russian security services, most notably accusing 
them of responsibility for the bombing of a Moscow apartment block. This attack had 
been blamed on Chechen terrorists by the Russian authorities and used, Litvinenko now 
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claimed, as a pretext for the second Chechen War. On his death-bed in London, 
Litvinenko alleged his murder by polonium poisoning was the result of a Russian state-
sponsored plot. The Government response was robust: four Russian diplomats were 
expelled, visa restrictions applied and cooperation on counter-terrorism suspended. The 
British Police quickly established that Andrei Lugovoi, a former KGB agent himself, 
was a person of interest in the investigation. The Russians refused the British request for 
his extradition on the grounds it would violate their Constitution. The Litvinenko matter 
remains on the bilateral political agenda, even after the 2010 change of British 
government, and has the capacity to plague inter-state relations for some time to come. 
The official preliminary hearing for the British inquest into the death began in 
September 2012, the media rife with reports that the Russian state might be found guilty 
of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. The hearing and the 2013 inquest that will follow 
may therefore derail recent attempts to restore diplomatic relations and put the 
relationship back on track. 
 
The Litvinenko murder is notable also for how it visibly served to underline for the 
British the futility of turning to the EU for solidarity, despite the extreme circumstances. 
The British Ambassador to Moscow at the time, Sir Tony Brenton, was treated to what 
can only be described as harassment by the Russian authorities and Putin supporters, 
such as Nashi, the Russian youth movement. The murder was an inexcusable breach of 
British sovereignty and even if one accepts then-President Putin’s argument that this 
was not state-sponsored, the bilateral relationship was not helped by the bellicose stance 
Russia adopted and the airtime given to Lugovoi at home. Despite British attempts to 
mobilize support in the EU, beyond informal messages of support to Brenton from other 
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EU diplomats and a lukewarm (considering the circumstances) supporting statement, 
the UK would be offered no reason to rethink their opinion that the EU is not an 
effective foreign policy actor. 
 
To return to the bilateral relationship, from the Russian perspective, the UK is hardly 
immune to criticism itself. Its own attempts to have persons of interest extradited have 
all met with failure. A case in point is the oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, who was granted 
political asylum following Russian extradition attempts. Like Lugovoi in Russia, 
Berezovsky was a prominent personality in the British media, including on extremely 
sensitive issues like the 2008 war in Georgia. This was despite the fact that the Crown 
Prosecution Service had investigated him for alleged attempts to incite violence abroad 
when he argued for regime change in Russia in a 2007 interview (HoC 2007). As for 
Denmark and Austria (see relevant chapters in this volume), the Chechen War would 
have direct consequences for the UK, when in 2003 it granted political asylum to former 
Chechen separatist leader Akhmad Zakayev, in defiance of Russian attempts at 
extradition. Even as Putin argued that such instances stood in the way of ‘normal’ 
relations (in Beeston 2008), it was clear that the Russians would or could not believe 
that Judge Timothy Workman’s decision to refuse the request for extradition was the 
defining ruling in the case and that this was not a matter for the British government. 
This misunderstanding may be said to have stemmed from differing perspectives about 
democracy and the separation of powers but it was a sign too of the mistrust the 
pervaded the relationship. In an attempt to restore the state of the now visibly poor 
relations, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2007 recommended an appeal be made 
to Russia’s pragmatism, that the UK adopt a less exclusive, more inclusive discourse 
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with Russia, and that it see the need to be more reflexive in examining its own 
behaviour. 
 
For just a little longer, these recommendations would not hold sway. The brief, yet 
pivotal, 2008 hot war in Georgia was met in Britain with severe disapprobation. Then-
Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008) accused Russia of irresponsible, unpredictable 
behaviour and took the opportunity to argue for the need to diversify energy supply to 
reduce Europe’s reliance on this unreliable actor. This very critical stance was not 
echoed by all other European member states, most notably France (see Le Noan in this 
volume), and instead engagement with Russia in the EU moved to a more pragmatic 
footing. The shift was supported by the British then-EU Trade Commissioner, Lord 
Peter Mandelson (2008), by virtue of ‘the strategic importance of our common interest’. 
The message found common voice within the UK as FCO Minister, Lord Malloch-
Brown, spoke of the need to step into Russia’s shoes and see how certain western 
actions looked ‘provocative’ (in HoC 2009). The new pragmatism, it should be noted, 
was not supposed to come at the expense of continuing to criticize Russia when deemed 
necessary. Whether the UK has stayed on the right side of this line, is debatable. 
 
The change of British government in 2010 made it easier for relations between the two 
states to move on. The new Secretary of State, William Hague, had met Russian Foreign 
Minister, Lavrov, in the months leading up to the General Election. Once in power, 
Hague and Prime Minister David Cameron made clear from the outset that foreign 
policy was about the promotion of trade as much as anything else, receiving a positive 
response from the business world (if not everyone else). Thus while the UK’s Foreign 
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Office may be a distinct entity from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
no less than in the Irish case the Foreign Minister has been at the forefront of the pursuit 
of British business interests. In September 2011, Prime Minister Cameron made the first 
British prime ministerial visit to Russia since the death of Litvinenko. Interpreted 
widely as a desire to move diplomatic relations on, Cameron nevertheless refused to 
restore links between the states’ security services, visibly emphasizing instead the 
economic aspects of the relationship by taking along a number of high profile business 
people. In November 2011, the Russian Ambassador, Alexander Yakovenko (in 
Embassy of Russian Federation 2012) said: 
 
A new chapter is being written now in the history of our countries’ relations. … 
Certainly, some differences in approaches still remain ... But business 
collaboration, as a foundation for the overall system of our bilateral relationship, 
once again became the focal point of the discussions. 
 
Trading and economic interests 
 
As elsewhere in the relationship, the narrative here is one of opportunity, some 
successes but some disappointments. British companies of all shapes and sizes have 
made inroads into the Russian market. Energy companies receive most media attention 
but the UK is represented in the drinks and food industry, in services (most notably 
financial and legal), the motor industry and so on. According to the FCO's offshoot, UK 
Trade and Investment (UKTI), some of the best opportunities for UK companies reside 
in advanced engineering, financial services, ICT, power/energy, sports and leisure. 
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The boom period for UK exports to Russia came in the years immediately leading up to 
Russia’s 1998 crash and subsequent devaluation of the rouble. In 1999, exports dropped 
by nearly 60 per cent even as import figures rose by approximately 66 percent in the 
period from 1997-99 (FCO 1999). In the period leading up to Litvinenko’s murder and 
the subsequent downturn in political relations, some recovery was experienced. By 2006 
the export market was worth 1.9 billion USD and imports 3.6 billion USD. The UK was 
Russia’s biggest foreign investor in 2006 and ranked fourth largest over the period 
2001-06. BP’s and Shell’s presence in Russia made the UK the largest foreign investor 
in the energy market. By this point, 400 UK companies were involved in Russia (HoC 
2007) and the number of Russian holdings in the UK was also increasing, albeit slowly. 
The CBI reported some disruption to business activities as a result of worsening 
political relations but the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded in 2007 that the overall 
effect to that date was limited. By 2008, Mandelson was referring to the 1,000 plus 
British companies operating in Russia, evidence that poor political relations do not 
inevitably lead to poor economic relations. Figures for 2010 and 2011 show the UK is 
maintaining a negative trade balance with Russia, of minus 2,123 million EUR for 2010 
and minus 3,329 for 2011 (Eurostat 2012). This compares favourably with all of the 
EU’s larger member states, including France, Germany and Italy. 
 
High profile cases involving the poor experiences of British companies in Russia have 
dominated media headlines in the UK. Most talked-about have been BP’s experiences, 
whose joint venture with Russia’s TNK resulted in visa disputes, police raids, Interior 
Ministry investigations into alleged tax evasion and ultimately BP boss Robert Dudley’s 
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departure from Russia following disputes over management. This did not prevent BP 
seeking further involvement with Russian corporations, suggesting the risks for BP are 
far outweighed by the benefits. Indeed, in 2011 David Peattie, Head of BP in Russia 
told the Executive Director of the Russo--British Chamber of Commerce (RBCC) he 
would do it all again because Russia is a great place to do business (interview with 
Stephen Dalziel 2012). Even following June 2012 reports that BP’s time in Russia may 
have come to an end, media reports show Peattie remains resolutely upbeat. 
 
Relying on the British media, it would be all too easy to assume that only extreme risk-
takers would dare to do business in Russia and this unfortunately has a negative effect 
on British attitudes to Russia. The RBCC reports a good deal of initial interest from 
British businesses but conservative attitudes that favour export rather than longer-term 
investment mean conversion rates of interested parties are low. Given the bureaucratic 
problems, Russia now presents best opportunities for those looking to do business in the 
longer-term. For those prepared to make a serious commitment - excellent prior 
research, contracts signed under English law and the establishment of good locally-
based teams - there are many positives. The new NGO law has added a new layer of 
bureaucracy but does not necessarily impact detrimentally on those working in Russia 
(interview with Stephen Dalziel 2012). The RBCC experience is also that poor political 
relations do not lead inexorably to poor trading relations, rather an attitude of ‘business 
is business’ prevails. Where politics does interfere is in respect of structures. The RBCC 
deals with a constant stream of complaints from clients requiring help with visas. While 
it is quite easy for Russians to secure visas, the processes are time-consuming and the 
loss of a passport for two to three weeks is detrimental to business. As a result, Paris, 
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Berlin and other continental European cities are preferred meeting places (interview 
with Stephen Dalziel 2012). It is the bureaucracy involved in setting up a business in 
Russia that is the single biggest problem, however. This is second on UKTI's (2010) list 
of market challenges and the problem becomes much more severe when one considers 
that the corruption that both the RBCC and UKTI identify as a feature of doing business 
in Russia is a not irrational response to problems of bureaucracy. 
 
People-to-people contacts 
 
Despite the more high-level problems, there can be little doubt about the attraction that 
the UK offers for Russians. Visa figures alone demonstrate this. The British Embassy in 
Moscow witnessed a rise in the issue of visas from approximately 3-5000 in the 1980s 
to twenty times that by 2000 (interview with former British Ambassador 2012). The 
numbers of people travelling both ways are positive indicators of the possibility of gaps 
being bridged in a way that governments simply cannot manage, of mutual knowledge 
gained and relationships formed. They represent something inherently good and right in 
their own right, which cannot ‘but have a significant effect over time’ (interview with 
former British ambassadors 2012). Clearly, however, governments play a role in 
creating the structures and environments in which different societies and individuals can 
connect. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that Russian political elites do not 
distinguish between contacts at the level of people and those at the level of government 
and fear societal contacts offer all too-many opportunities for espionage and 
dissemination of propaganda. Clearly there exists a close connection between the 
interests of any state and the values it espouses. After all, as already established, a free 
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and democratic Russia is a more stable one, reducing the threat of economic migration 
and offering a prosperous market in which British businesses can profit. Government-
sponsored and facilitated activities include the Department for International 
Development’s (DfID) Know How Fund (KHF), and the British Council. These British 
ventures in Russia serve both the UK’s interests and its values, even while benefiting 
ordinary Russians too. As former Prime Minister Tony Blair said: ‘In the end values and 
interests merge’ (1999). However, the British are resolute that there exists a separation 
between state and society, and that the government role is restricted to helping construct 
a favourable environment and framework to facilitate exchange, eschewing interference 
in the day-to-day activities of non-governmental actors. The NGO law indicates Russia 
does not fully accept this. 
 
For the FCO, the KHF was designed as a key facilitating instrument, a mirror to the 
EU’s TACIS, to assist Russia in its transition to a market economy, consistent with both 
Russian (professed) objectives and UK values and interests. It was also about the 
trickle-down of technical and commercial knowledge to society. Young Russian 
managers were to be trained in the UK in order that they could return to Russia with 
increased knowledge of how business was conducted in the West. The British Council 
was also to play a key part in the government’s activity in Russia but again with the aim 
of transfer of knowledge and experience to ordinary Russians. The British Council is 
open about its objective of promoting interest in and knowledge of the UK and open too 
about its administration of the scholarship programme of the FCO, which enables 
regional administrators to study in Britain. During Sir Roderic Lyne’s time in Russia 
(2000-2004), 15 British Council offices were established, staffed mostly by Russians, 
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open to Russians and providing them with access to key resources, for instance, 
computers. The offices facilitated exposure to British culture and the English language 
but worked free of government interference (interview with former British Council staff 
member 2012). Nevertheless, ultimately staff at British Council offices in Russia would 
experience what the Council called ‘intimidation’, forcing them in early 2008 to close 
their offices outside Moscow on the basis of ‘external pressures’ (FCO 2009). The BBC 
World Service’s experiences were hardly more promising, manoeuvrings by Russia’s 
regulatory board effectively limiting its transmissions to larger urban areas such as 
Moscow and St Petersburg. In response, it concentrated efforts on online activity, 
encountering no obstacles in doing so (FCO 2009). However, developments in 2012 
suggest the Russian government will become increasingly repressive in respect of 
internet usage. Effective hacking activities and campaigns of ‘dis-information’ are now 
being accompanied by tactics to restrict access, such as we have seen adopted by China 
for some time now. 
 
People-to-people contacts occur outside directly government-facilitated schemes, of 
course. The UK enjoys a good reputation in Russia for the quality and integrity of its 
education, finance and judicial sectors. The UK remains the destination of choice for 
wealthy Russians seeking to educate their children abroad. As for finance, when Russia 
began to need access to money markets, London held more attraction than New York, in 
London Russians felt more comfortable and were condescended to less (interviews with 
former British ambassadors 2012). Today, the ‘London Stock Exchange remains a 
principal international platform for [Russian] companies to access global capital 
markets with more than 60 Russian and Russian-focused companies listed on the 
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International Order Book’ (Embassy of Russian Federation 2012). Meanwhile, the 
status accorded to the British legal system by Russians has been evident in the seeming 
rash of legal disputes by Russian oligarchs pursuing their cause in London’s courts. It 
must be recognised, however, that the importance of all these links in terms of exchange 
is diminished somewhat by the fact that many of the Russians coming to be educated in 
the UK do not return home and share that knowledge. Reflecting a relative lack of 
opportunity, Russia is experiencing a brain drain, which is detrimental to its own 
economy and to the deepening of understanding between the two states. 
 
The EU in UK Foreign Policy 
 
A noticeable absence from the UK--Russia relationship is the EU. Given the close 
relations so many of the EU member states have with Russia and the range and extent of 
the EU’s cooperative activities with Russia, it must be, for the uninitiated, a source of 
surprise that the UK does not conduct more of its relations with Russia through the 
multilateral resources available to it within the EU. This is particularly so given the UK 
has experienced some deeply troubling moments in its relations with Russia, moments 
which held warnings for other European states about Russia’s likely transition to a 
democracy based on rule of law, and which should, prima facie, have evoked a far 
stronger and more unified approach than they did. The UK opinion of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor is, it is fair to say, resigned, at best. The dominant perception is that 
a major part of the problem is that the many and various bilateral relations present a 
major obstacle to the establishment of a common Russia policy. From both the UK and 
the wider EU perspective, it is clear the EU has reached the limits of its capacities to 
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effect change in Russia; WTO membership is vital if Russia is to learn the importance 
of the rule of law and to become a more reliable partner (interviews with European 
Commission officials 2011
2
 and former British ambassadors to Russia 2012). Whether 
even WTO membership will in and of itself be enough is highly questionable. 
 
Listening to British accounts of EU failings, however, one cannot help but reflect on 
that fact that unity has to begin somewhere. If the EU has failed to establish a Russia 
policy, then the UK, as one of the 27 member states, must inevitably shoulder some 
blame. It is true that many of the reasons that bring the EU member states together to 
seek joint solutions to common problems regarding Russia do not pertain to the UK: 
energy dependence, insufficiency of foreign policy resources and perception of direct 
threat. This brings benefits to the EU in that the UK does not seek regularly to upload 
issues to the EU, indeed it prefers to rely on its own resources (David 2011). However, 
the flipside of that lack of engagement is that the EU suffers losses in that the UK fails 
to use its diplomatic resources for the benefit of the wider European good. As for why 
(leaving aside the residual attitude of great power status), from the UK perspective the 
EU has exhibited little unity over the Russia question and has been singularly poor at 
defending those values for which it stands, particularly as they relate to rule of law and 
human rights, as the differing discourses over Georgia demonstrated. The FCO position 
is that the EU must negotiate a ‘rules-based relationship with Russia’ and seek a 
replacement for the PCA that is ‘robust’, covering the entire range of EU—Russia 
relations and ensure it ‘will not be unconditional’ (HoC Defence Committee 2009). In 
the same report, the FCO speaks of the EU’s need to engage in dialogue and negotiation 
with Russia. What must precede that, however, is an arrangement suitable to ensure the 
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member states can first engage in dialogue and negotiation with each other. No current 
arrangement achieves that and it is the multiplicity of voices, despite the commonality 
of interests, which is the biggest hindrance to an effective EU—Russia policy. The UK 
does not constitute the biggest headache for the EU; indeed, in a range of interviews, the 
states most commonly referenced as obstacles to a Russia policy were France, Germany 
and Italy. 
 
Many UK officials are not unappreciative of the fact that the EU has scored some goals. 
In relation to Russian membership of the WTO, the EU was credited; as it was too for 
its progress in relation to energy policy (interviews with former British ambassadors, 
2012). However, the compliments were directed at a narrow sampling of EU entities: 
DG Trade, DG Energy, and notably the European Parliament for its strong defence (in 
marked contrast to the member states and the Council) of human rights and its very 
outspoken record against Russia in this regard. Implicit in all conversations, but explicit 
rarely, was a perception of limited agency on the part of the EU, or indeed the UK. Sir 
Andrew Wood (Shevtsova and Wood 2011) has argued that: ‘It is Russia’s own historic 
development that will count, not the rhetoric of foreigners, and Russia is in a self-
absorbed condition. Outside influence seems to me to be limited at best’. 
 
 The one exception to this is the WTO, which was consistently evoked as the most 
necessary step to be taken if Russia is to become a reliable partner for the West. 
However, the UK adheres most strongly to the view that real change will come only 
when there is a change of the guard within Russia. Thus, the protests seen in Russia 
following the parliamentary and presidential elections in late 2011 and early 2012 are 
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vindication of an approach that criticizes Russia for human rights violations and 
emphasizes the importance of adherence to certain norms and standards of behaviour, 
but which simultaneously pursues partnerships at the various levels of state and society. 
In this, there is really little daylight between the EU and UK positions. For the UK, 
however, until other member states come to appreciate that and act accordingly, the EU 
will remain an ineffective foreign policy actor, affecting the willingness of the UK to 
act through it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While Ireland and the UK are quite different foreign policy actors, in one fundamental 
aspect they are similar and that is in respect of their economic interconnectedness with 
the EU. Indeed, Hay and Smith (2010: 129) argue that they, along with the rest of the 
EU and Europe, ‘have experienced a de-globalisation not a globalisation of [their] 
economic activities’. Each state does adopt a different approach, however, to this 
interconnectedness and has varying levels of capacity to effect change within the EU. 
Ireland is distinct from the UK by virtue of its relatively positive ‘can-do’ attitude 
within the EU context, albeit it is relatively protected by its status as a small state and 
what might fairly be regarded as the lower expectations that others have of it, and it of 
itself. To date, Ireland has embraced its place in Europe and the EU. Any questions of 
sovereignty have revolved around the issue of neutrality mainly but also other issues 
that reflect on Irish identity, abortion laws for instance. On the whole, however, 
membership of the EU has been interpreted as an enhancement of Irish sovereignty, not 
a loss of it, again, a story common to many of the EU’s smaller member states. In 
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respect of sovereignty, the opposite is true of the UK, where the dominant, political, 
media and societal discourse is of the EU tapping away at the walls of British 
sovereignty, of an insiders’ defence against encroachment by ‘outsiders’. This is a 
paradoxical reflection of ideas about the UK’s economic and political significance 
relative to many EU member states, but fears also about a diminishing role for the UK 
in world affairs. In this, Russia and the UK have much in common. Compared to 
Ireland, the UK’s resource base means that it has greater capacity to build bilateral 
relations that serve its interests well and reduce the imperative to coordinate its relations 
within a multilateral environment. It is perhaps telling, however, that the Irish 
Government is directing resources and efforts into building a deeper bilateral 
relationship with Russia, even as the EU seeks to build a more unified Russia policy. 
How is this to be interpreted? 
 
It is Ireland’s economic interests that are driving its interactions with Russia. There is a 
close connection between the Irish government and Irish business (the Foreign Ministry 
is the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister of State led the June 
mission to Moscow) so it would be surprising if we did not see government policy 
reflecting Irish business interests. As for that, the Chief Executive of the Irish 
Exporters’ Association has ‘urged’ Irish businesses to exploit the potential of the 2012 
trade missions in order ‘to break away from the stagnant EU markets’ (Whelan in 
Corcoran 2012a). This suggests that the government too will continue to court Russian 
trade and this will inevitably affect some of the positions Ireland will adopt in relation 
to the EU’s relations with Russia but there is no reason to think they will impact 
negatively on the EU. Indeed, it may mean Ireland will play an increasingly active and 
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constructive role. Ireland is intent on freeing up the visa regime with Russia, a subject 
which has long been on the EU’s political agenda and its agreement on space 
exploration is a consequence of a wider EU initiative. 
 
Implicit in all the criticism of the EU is the assumption that if the member states did 
adopt a common stance in their relations with Russia, then Russia would be brought 
round to ‘our’ way of thinking. However, it is worth remembering Sir Andrew Wood’s 
admonition that ultimately change needs to come from within Russia itself. Events 
within Russia suggest that change may well be coming. The question is where the EU 
and its member states should position themselves in respect of it. Change is needed in 
the EU too, in particular for mechanisms that enable the member states to come together 
to share perceptions and arguments on Russia, to analyze and to agree on answers and 
desirable parameters of action. Without such mechanisms, and despite a wealth of 
excellent analysis available to the EU, the member states see the same thing differently 
and fail to appreciate the insights that other states have to offer (interviews with former 
British ambassadors, 2012). The lesson from the UK is that business is business and can 
be compartmentalised to a large extent from politics. After all, British trading figures 
with Russia rose even as the bilateral political relationship suffered, all parties 
recognizing the extent to which each other’s prosperity was dependent on facilitating 
business relations. The Ireland--Russia and UK—Russia relationships will be sustained 
in the longer term by the mutual recognition of business and trading opportunities and 
the people-to-people contacts that promote a genuine cultural exchange. 
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1
 Interviews were conducted in 2012 with three former British Ambassadors to Russia; also with 
representatives of NGOS and the Russo--British Chamber of Commerce. 
2
 Interviews were conducted in 2011 within COEST, the European Commission and the EEAS. 
